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Executive summary
The rapid rise of online market places such as Amazon, peer-to-peer platforms like Uber, social 
networks and other forms of online platforms has characterized the digital transformation of 
the last decade. These online platforms now play a key role in today’s economy and the func-
tioning and governance of the internet. They have brought real benefits for consumers and 
businesses in the EU by giving them easier access to products and services and facilitating 
transactions between them. At the same time, their meteoric growth has caused concerns 
about market dominance and the widening information and power asymmetry between plat-
forms and citizens, businesses and regulators alike. Online platforms, moreover, challenge the 
regulatory framework of the Single Market. These challenges often culminate in the call for 
more “platform regulation” at European level. 
The aim of this paper is to shed light on these challenges and the European debate on plat-
form regulation. In particular, it seeks to 1.) Provide an overview of existing regulation of online 
platforms in the Single Market; 2.) Examine current regulatory challenges for the platform 
economy in the EU; and 3.) Propose guidelines for the future European debate on platform 
regulation.
Key takeaways:
1. Online platforms in the Single Market are subject to various forms of regulatory gover-
nance. Apart from the EU acquis and ex-post intervention by national and European com-
petition authorities and courts, self- and co-regulatory measures feature increasingly pro-
minently. 
2. Outdated contractual law, market concentration on some platform markets as well as the 
increasing use of automated decision-making systems have led to power and information 
asymmetries between dominant platforms and their users as well as between platforms 
and their competitors. 
3. Existing regulatory challenges should be addressed with two overarching guidelines: 
1. Preserve the integrity of the Single Market, as the danger of market fragmentation is 
already looming large. 2. Establish confidence in a European platform economy, as the 
current distrust of digital platforms in the EU should not be allowed to turn into a perma-
nent “tech lash”.
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1 ▪ “PLATFORM REGULATION” IN THE EU. A PRIMER
1.1 Examining a catch-all term 
The debate on the European digital economy and the Digital Single Market increasingly centres 
on the activities, business models and market power of online platforms. European heads of 
states recently warned “social networks and other digital platforms” that they “need to gua-
rantee transparent practices and full protection of citizens’ privacy and personal data” in the 
light of the Cambridge Analytica scandal.1 Yet, calls for regulation from a variety of stakehol-
ders reach much further. Labour relations, consumer protection, data protection, taxation, co-
pyright or competition are just a few of the regulatory fields where politicians and civil society 
actors have called for European “platform regulation” in the last few years. 
In the wake of these debates European law makers and regulatory bodies have significantly 
stepped up their activities regarding online platforms. A new proposal for a Regulation by the 
Commission targets for example “platform-to-business” relations. It seeks to strengthen the 
rights of businesses operating in online market places vis-à-vis operators such as Amazon.2 
Google is the subject of two ongoing investigations by the Commission into whether the com-
pany has abused its market power on its different online platforms. It was already fined €2.42 
billion in a third case in 2017.3 Platforms and the legal, economic and social implications of 
their use of machine learning software and algorithms in general also feature prominently in 
the recently published AI strategy from the Commission.4 
The reason for the omnipresence of calls to action for “platform regulation” is straight-
forward. These demands reflect the dominant position online platforms have achieved in the 
intermediation between supply and demand and thereby the organization of online markets 
in general in recent years. Online platforms have become a central pillar of business activity 
and a key facilitator of online economic transactions in the EU, especially in the market for 
business-to-consumer services: Spearheaded by the “GAFA”5 tech giants, platform companies 
including, for example, Uber, Spotify or Skyscanner intermediated about 60 percent of all pri-
vately consumed goods and services within the digital economy across the Single Market in 
2015, according to estimates by Copenhagen Economics.6 E-commerce is growing particu-
larly fast, with turnover growth of about 13 percent per year in the Single Market and sales 
amounting to around €500 billion in 2017.7 Business activity and industries affected by online 
platforms range from retail to publishing to hotel and taxi industries. The platform model of 
organizing markets also increasingly plays a role in business-to-business industries such as 
manufacturing.
1.  European Council, European Council Meeting (22 March 2018) Conclusions, 22.03.2018.
2.  European Commission, Regulation on promoting fairness and transparency for business users of online intermediation services and 
online search engines in the Digital Single Market, Leaked proposal document, March 2018.
3.  European Commission, Antitrust: Commission fines Google €2.42 billion for abusing dominance as search engine by giving illegal 
advantage to own comparison shopping service, press release, 27.06.2017.
4.  European Commission, Artificial Intelligence for Europe, 25.04.2018.
5.  Google, Amazon, Facebook and Apple, the four most valuable companies whose business models rely to a large extent on online 
platforms.
6.  Copenhagen Economics, Online Intermediaries: Impact on the EU Economy, 2015.
7.  Ecommerce Foundation, European Ecommerce Report 2017.
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BOX 1 ▪ What is a platform?
Even though the term is widely used in public discourse, there is no consensus about the exact definition of the terms “platform” or “platform 
economy”. One reason for this is that the variety of services intermediated by online platforms has become extensive. Their business models also 
vary and range from subscription models to advertising to the collection of transaction fees (see box 2).  The European Commission has defined 
a platform as ‘an undertaking operating in two (or multi)-sided markets, which uses the Internet to enable interactions between two or more 
distinct but interdependent groups of users so as to generate value for at least one of the groups.’8 In contrast, the French Conseil National du 
Numérique (CNNum) defines a platform as ‘a service that provides an intermediary function in the access of information, goods or services that 
are usually provided by third parties (own translation)’.9 In a nutshell and for the purpose of this paper, platforms can be defined as online inter-
mediators which offer facilitation and transaction services. They bring together supply and demand sides and thereby organize online markets. 
For the functioning of the Single Market online intermediaries and platforms have been first 
and foremost a boon. By lowering barriers to entry, breaking down information asymmetries 
between buyers and sellers (for example in the taxi or hotel markets) and establishing trust 
and reputation systems, online intermediaries have brought the Single Market closer to its 
original idea of facilitating (cross-border) trading of goods and services. Smaller businesses 
profit in particular from lower entry barriers by gaining easier access to European customers, 
as almost 85 percent of European households had access to the internet by 2017.10 Online 
platforms have also enabled a better functioning of the Single Market for consumers, for 
example by creating Europe-wide online comparison websites for goods and services. That, 
of course, does not mean that there exists a frictionless Single Market for online cross-border 
commerce – issues such as different VAT regimes or high legal costs due to different interpre-
tations of consumer protection regulation still hamper its potential.
FIGURE 1 ▪ EU citizens buying goods and services online, % of total population
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However, the ascent of the platform economy and their central role within the emerging Eu-
ropean digital economy has also led to rising concerns about the growing power of internet 
platforms in the EU and its member states. While platforms have lowered barriers for consu-
mers and businesses, some have at the same time erected new barriers for potential com-
petitors. Their position as organizers of online markets has given them substantial clout over 
8. European Commission, Regulatory environment for platforms, online intermediaries, data and cloud computing and the collaborative 
economy, Survey document in preparation of a Communication. Date? 
9. Conseil national du numérique, Ambition numérique, Pour une politique française européenne de la transition numérique, report 
submitted to the Prime Minister, June 2015. 
10.  Eurostat, Households with Internet Access and with broadband connection EU-28, 2007-2016 (as % of all households).
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other market participants, especially businesses on the supply side. The increasing societal 
influence of larger platforms, for example Facebook’s or Google’s (in)direct shaping of the 
public discourse, has led to calls for higher regulatory scrutiny of their internal operations, in 
particular with regard to their use of data and algorithms.
BOX 2 ▪ Online platforms operate in a wide range of market activities11
TYPE OF PLATFORM MAIN BUSINESS MODEL EXAMPLE
Online marketplaces Transaction fees Amazon, eBay, Allegro, Booking.com
Collaborative or ‘sharing’ economy 
platforms Transaction fees Uber, Airbnb, Taskrabbit, Bla-bla car
Communication platforms Advertisement, subscription Skype, WhatsApp
Social networks Advertisement, subscription Facebook, LinkedIn, Twitter
Search engines and specialised 
search tools Advertisement
Google search, TripAdvisor, Twenga, 
Yelp, Skyscanner
News aggregators Advertisement Google news
Music/ Video sharing platforms Subscription, advertisement Deezer, Spotify YouTube, Dailymo-tion, Netflix, Canal Play, Apple TV
App stores Transaction fees Google Play, Apple app store
Payment systems Transaction fees PayPal, Apple Pay
The concerns over the power of online platforms raised in the ongoing political debate can be 
roughly grouped into two categories:
1. Competition and market power: Platforms generate regulatory concerns because of their 
expanding market power. Many platform markets tend towards domination by one or 
very few players, thanks to, among other things, strong network effects and economies of 
scale advantages. Another concern is the way in which platforms are able to leverage their 
exclusive access to vast amounts of consumer, business and transactional data. These 
data troves give them a constantly self-reinforcing knowledge edge with regards to market 
dynamics over competitors and regulators alike. 
2. Algorithmic discrimination and information asymmetries: Most platforms heavily rely 
on automated algorithm-based decision-making to process transactions and data. Auto-
mated decision-making systems are efficient and often more impartial than human deci-
sion makers. But they can also perpetuate discrimination and deleteriously affect Euro-
pean citizens. Yet, proving such a discriminatory bias can be complicated: The inner logic 
of automated decision-making systems remains opaque to businesses and individuals 
operating on a platform. This so-called “algorithmic black box” also complicates regulato-
ry scrutiny. 
Apart from both these challenges, there are mounting concerns over how the activities of large 
online platforms might lead to undesirable external effects. Airbnb has been accused of foste-
ring gentrification processes in popular urban neighbourhoods in cities like Amsterdam; Uber 
and other on-demand platforms have been criticized for eroding European labour standards; 
and Facebook has been charged with facilitating the unravelling of the social fabric in Europe.12 
Last, but not least, big online platforms such as Google, Amazon and Facebook and other digi-
tal companies are routinely criticized for making extensive use of elaborate strategies to lower 
11. Short version of platform typology by the European Commission, Online Platforms and the Digital Single Market. Opportunities and 
Challenges for Europe. Communication from the European Commission, 25.05.2016.
12.  Julia Carrie Wong, Former Facebook executive: social media is ripping society apart, The Guardian, 12.12.2017.
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their tax burden in the Single Market, contributing to the erosion of member states’ budgets.13 
All these issues may merit further discussion but this paper focuses on challenges related to 
the inner operations of online platforms and not on external effects.
1.2 How platforms are regulated in the Single Market
Given the diversity of business models and the number of policy challenges involved, it is no 
surprise that “platform regulation” has become a catch-all term. Amidst the many political and 
economic debates around future regulation, it is important to first recall the regulation and 
governance set-up to which online platforms are already subject. Just like those of other mar-
ket participants in the Single Market, platform activities are subject to the EU acquis in areas 
such as consumer protection, copyright, competition and data protection. Platforms have, for 
example, to abide by the Consumer Rights Directive. They are also bound by various Direc-
tives directly regulating market behaviour. The two most relevant here are the E-Commerce 
Directive 2000/31/EC and the Services Directive 2006/123/EC. The platform economy is also 
marked by an increasing degree of self-regulation.  Three characteristics of the regulatory 
framework of online platforms deserve further attention: 
1. Categorization of platforms. Most online platforms are considered providers of “informa-
tion society services”, under the E-Commerce Directive 2000/31/EC. Information society 
services are defined as “any service normally provided for remuneration, at a distance, 
by electronic means and at the individual request of a recipient of services” in Directive 
98/34/EC.14 Since most online platforms offer an intermediation of services by electronic 
means, they may fall within this categorization, with consequences for their regulation. 
The categorization and the terms of the Services Directive 2006/123/EC, which states 
that member states can only regulate certain cross-border services in limited ways, may 
spare a platform from being liable to national or local sector-specific regulation in the 
Single Market. Online platform companies therefore seek to escape being defined as pro-
viding services in, say, accommodation or taxis specifically but, rather information society 
services under the E-Commerce Directive. This categorization is however contentious, not 
least since the actual services intermediated by platforms (transport, housing, delivery) 
are not usually considered information society services. The degree to which online plat-
forms are involved in delivering the actual service (for example personal transport) might 
thus determine their future categorization. In 2017, for example, the ECJ ruled that Uber 
Pop could be classified as a transportation service and member states governments (as 
well as local authorities) could hence regulate the service locally and according to sec-
tor-specific regulation.15 The court justified its ruling with the argument that Uber was not 
only providing an intermediation service, but simultaneously also an urban transportation 
service, which it generally organizes using software tools.16
2. Intermediary liability exemption. Another central aspect for the regulation of many online 
platforms is the limited liability regime enshrined in E-Commerce Directive 2000/31/EC. 
Under it, information society services that engage in “mere conduit”, “hosting” or “caching” 
of information (i.e. that act as certain types of intermediators) are exempt from liability. 
Many platforms are hence non-liable when fraudulent practices occur on their platforms, 
unless and until they have been noticed of these practices or ordered to take down certain 
content.  Without this limited liability under the Directive, platforms like eBay or Facebook 
13.  Paul-Jasper Dittrich, Pola Schneemelcher, Tax Me If You Can. The current debate on taxing digital businesses in the EU. Jacques 
Delors Institut – Berlin, Blog Post, 16.01.2018.  
14.  Directive 98/34/EC laying down a procedure for the provision of information in the field of technical standards and regulations and 
of rules on Information Society Services.
15.  Mehreen Khan and Aliya Ram, ECJ rules Uber can be regulated as taxi company, Financial Times, 20.12.2017.
16.  Roellen van Neck, ECJ: Uber renders transport services, not information society services, Digital Business Law, 20.12.2017.
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would be held liable for any unlawful content uploaded by users (counterfeit goods, child 
pornography, copyright-infringing content etc.). Retaining this exemption from liability is 
thus considered vital for the existence of many platform business models. It also lowers 
barriers to market entry for new platforms. At the same time, it is important to curb the 
proliferation of, for example, illegal content uploaded to online platforms. This is now 
mainly done via self-regulatory measures.
3. Self-regulation. The European platform economy is characterized by a high degree of 
self-regulation, in addition to legislation. In its 2016 Communication on Online Platforms, 
the Commission argued that traditional top-down legislation reaches its limits in the plat-
form economy and that therefore self-regulatory and co-regulatory measures are likely 
to stay or become even more important for that economy’s future governance.17 What 
does that mean in practice? In the EU, self-regulation officially refers to ‘the possibility for 
economic operators, the social partners, non-governmental organisations or associations 
to adopt amongst themselves and for themselves common guidelines at European level 
(particularly codes of practice or sectoral agreements)’.18 The Commission has, for exa-
mple, recently proposed a self-regulatory mechanism to fight fake news. 
Via their Terms and Conditions, online platforms create a set of rules intended to govern tran-
sactions, ensure the functioning of reputational systems or enforce their code of conduct, for 
example Facebook’s Community Guidelines. These private governance frameworks can be 
considered as a form of individual, platform-level self-regulation and the term “self-regulation” 
is indeed used in that way in the current European debate.19 Perhaps not surprisingly, the idea 
of self-regulation as the future main mode of governance of the platform economy is in 
serious dispute. Consumer advocates and other civil society actors regularly caution against 
any gradual shift of legislative and executive authority to private actors. They point to the lack 
of transparency and accountability resulting from online platforms being allowed to set up 
their own rules or benchmarking targets without the broader involvement and scrutiny of civil 
society stakeholders or regulators. 
Is the regulatory regime fit to meet the challenges that online platforms currently pose to the 
rules of the Single Market or does the governance framework described above need an up-
date? The next section examines these questions by reviewing the overall European approach 
to online platforms and some of the current regulatory challenges. 
2 ▪ MAPPING THE REGULATORY CHALLENGES
2.1 Guidelines for the debate on platform regulation in the Single Market 
Before examining the specific regulatory challenges in individual policy areas, it is important 
to take one more step back and discuss the overall rationale behind the European approach 
towards online platforms. The overarching question of the debate on “platform regulation” is 
whether the novelty of platform business models truly warrants substantial new regulation or 
“merely” a shift in governance models in the Single Market and, if yes, which specific updates 
are indeed required. 
17.   European Commission, Online Platforms and the Digital Single Market. Opportunities and Challenges for Europe. Communication 
from the European Commission, 25.05.2016.
18.  European Parliament, Council and the Commission, Interinstitutional Agreement on Better Lawmaking, OJ C 321/01., Official 
Journal of the European Union, 2003
19.  Michèle Finck, Digital Co-Regulation: Designing a Supranational Legal Framework for the Platform Economy (June 20, 2017). 
European Law Review (2018 Forthcoming); LSE Legal Studies Working Paper No. 15/2017
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As usual, new regulation in the Single Market has to be evidence-based and well-founded, 
address market failures or be justified by shared social goals as a whole. This paper argues, 
however, that new regulation of online platforms and the platform economy should also always 
be seen as a means to enhance the Single Market. Concretely, the debate on future regulation 
of the platform economy should be guided by two overarching guidelines:
1. Preserve the integrity and potential of the Single Market
2. Establish trust in an innovative European platform economy
2.1.1 Preserve the integrity and potential of the Single Market 
Online platforms have in many ways enabled the Single Market to work more smoothly and 
efficiently, for example by creating Europe-wide online comparison websites for goods and 
services. Small businesses like E-commerce traders have many more possibilities to sell 
across the Single Market thanks to easier transactions via online platforms. Yet this success 
is put at risk once too many national governments enact national requirements for online 
platforms. At European level, the Commission has clarified its main goals in any upcoming 
regulation for online platforms: A “level playing field” for comparable digital services as well as 
“open and non-discriminatory markets”. By applying such a “light touch” regulation (focus on 
self-regulatory measures and amending extant regulation on a problem-driven, sectoral basis) 
the Commission is trying to preserve the integrity of the Single Market while at the same time 
not overburdening youthful and ambitious European platforms with regulation in order to help 
them grow in the Single Market.20 Larger member states, such as France and Germany, have 
been calling on the EU to rein in the perceived power of online platforms and (often US-owned) 
tech giants.21 Some countries have also introduced national platform regulation across the 
board. The French Law for a Digital Republic of 2016, for example, forces platforms in general 
to provide more transparent information to consumers on the criteria behind algorithmic de-
cision-making for rankings or referencing.22 However useful an individual piece of legislation 
may be, the resulting regulatory fragmentation can lead to legal uncertainty and slow down 
or even hinder market access for newcomers. This is of especial concern for the European 
platform economy which has often struggled to scale up and harness the opportunities within 
a unified European market.23 Preserving the integrity of the Single Market and enhancing its 
potential for young European companies should thus become a guiding principle for all future 
approaches to platform regulation. 
2.1.2 Establish trust in an innovative European platform economy
A second core element should be the question of how to generate and keep the trust of Euro-
pean citizens in the ongoing digital transformation as exemplified by large online platforms. 
Europeans should be given no sense that the EU is unable to protect them from fraudulent use 
of their data, non-transparent or even discriminating algorithms and the unchecked market 
power of large online platforms. Otherwise, they might turn their backs on the EU even further 
amidst a growing “tech lash”. If the EU on the other hand can prove its worth as a rule-maker 
and protector of consumers and fundamental rights, European citizens might also become 
more open to and embrace the possibilities the European platform economy opens up for 
cross-border exchange and commerce. A recent example for this “Brussels effect” is the Gene-
ral Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) which is rapidly becoming a global standard.
20.  European Commission, Online Platforms and the Digital Single Market. Opportunities and Challenges for Europe. Communication 
from the European Commission, 25.05.2016.
21.  Duncan Robinson and Alex Barker, EU to probe popular US sites over data use and search, Financial Times, 30.04.2015.
22. Legifrance, LOI n° 2016-1321 du 7 octobre 2016 pour une République numérique, official text (in French).
23.  Paul-Jasper Dittrich, How to Scale Up in the EU? Creating a Better integrated Single Market for Start-Ups, 10.11.2017. 
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How could the guidelines sketched out above be implemented in practice? The next sections 
examine these parameters by reviewing three policy areas with relevance to European ap-
proaches to platform regulation currently under discussion:
a) Platform to business relations
b) Competition, multi-sided markets and data
c) Algorithmic decision-making and discrimination. 
2.2 Platform to business relations 
A key characteristic of many platforms is the triangular contractual relationship between plat-
form, supplier and the user/consumer. Transactions take place between all and each of the 
actors. A user, by signing up to a platform like Airbnb, has to agree to its “General Terms and 
Conditions”, thereby entering a contractual relationship with the platform. The consumer can 
then in most cases enter contractual arrangements with other platform users (for example 
renting out an apartment). The platform facilitates and accompanies these transactions by 
providing certain payment and insurance services, refund policies and, most importantly, by 
helping the contracting parties find each other in the first place (intermediation service). De-
pending on the specific platform model this intermediation or match-making between supply 
and demand can entail more or less direct involvement by the platform itself. By setting the 
General Terms and Conditions a company exerts a powerful role over both sides of the 
market as it determines their room for manoeuvre and their rights vis-à-vis each other and 
vis-à-vis the platform itself.
The triangular relationship of platforms challenges conventional definitions that stem from a 
logic of traditional industrial supply chains. One can clearly see the mismatch between how 
traditional regulation and platforms operate in the legal definition of platform actors.24 EU 
24.  Aneta Wiewiórowska-Domagalska, Online Platforms: How to Adapt Regulatory Framework to the Digital Age?, Briefing for the IMCO 
Committee of the European Parliament, 24.09.2017.
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contractual law is still mainly designed for business-consumer relationships. Since platforms 
engage various types of users, many of them not classical (individual) consumers but com-
panies/suppliers, concerns have arisen that they do not adequately address the needs of bu-
sinesses operating on them. Whereas consumers are protected by strong European protective 
legislation, businesses wield much less clout vis-à-vis online platforms.
Often, online platforms not only exert power over suppliers, but discriminate against them.25 
Businesses operating as sellers of goods or suppliers of services for example have an inade-
quate level of protection against arbitrary de-listing by large platforms, with only complicated 
and costly options for filing redress requests. There have been repeated cases where platforms 
have favoured their own goods and services over those offered by suppliers on the platform. 
This is especially relevant for e-commerce or collaborative or ‘sharing’ economy platforms, 
which often evolve slowly from facilitating occasional transactions by private entities (indivi-
dual buyers and sellers on eBay) to governing transactions between private buyers and micro/
small enterprises (professional re-sellers on Amazon, professional sub-letters on Airbnb etc.). 
What consequences should policy-makers draw from this state of affairs? Platform neu-
trality, i.e. a rule that strictly forbids platforms from favouring their own services over those of 
suppliers on their platform, might ultimately have to be enforced by regulation. The EU, with 
its latest legislative proposals, seems to be moving in this direction. One result of the policy 
and consultation processes on platform regulation of the last two years is the proposal for a 
platform-to-business regulation by the Commission, published in April 2018. To establish a 
“level playing field” it attempts to strengthen individual businesses’ rights vis-à-vis platforms 
and to prevent unfair trading practices. The proposed regulation covers the non-transparent 
de-listing of businesses and platforms and denying businesses access to data collected about 
their transactions on the platform (the “data privilege” of platforms) while increasing the possi-
bilities for collective redress against platform operators.26 It has also identified a lack of trans-
parency on the part of platforms towards businesses operating on them, for example with re-
gards to the ranking of “search results”. Establishing the possibility of collective redress and a 
dispute settlement mechanism could increase predictability and legal certainty for businesses 
on platforms. Protecting and strengthening the rights of smaller businesses vis-à-vis large 
platforms should be welcomed as a measure to strengthen the potential of the Single Market. 
2.3 Competition, multi-sided markets and data
Online platforms facilitate contracts between suppliers and users of a certain product or ser-
vice, thereby usually creating a two- or multisided online market. These markets have well-re-
searched properties.27 From a European competition perspective attention mainly needs to be 
paid to online platform markets where 1.) Indirect network effects play a significant role and 2.) 
Platform business models are able to take advantage of large economies of scale and scope 
that arise from largely intangible, data-driven services and 3) platforms have a unique access 
to data or are able to leverage data sets from various sources- to offer a service. 
1. Indirect network effects. Online-based platforms operating on data-driven multisided 
markets can take advantage of direct and indirect (across groups) network effects. Direct 
network effects occur when individual membership of a network gains greater value the 
greater the number of nodes in that network (for example a telephone network). Indirect 
network effects occur if more nodes exist across groups (the more suppliers on a network, 
25.  Friso Bostoen, Neutrality, fairness or freedom? Principles for platform regulation. Internet Policy Review, 7(1), 2018.
26.  European Commission, Proposal for a Regulation on promoting fairness and transparency for business users of online intermedia-
tion services, 26.04.2018. (ist das die leaked version von fn2 oben oder eine andere?)
27.  For an overview on multisided markets and network effects see for example Paul Belleflamme and Martin Peitz, Platforms and 
network effects. University of Mannheim Working Paper Series, Working Paper 16-14, 09.2016.
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the more buyers and vice versa). Indirect network effects often reinforce each other and 
over time lead to a clustering of users and businesses on one platform and thus strong 
market concentration. 
2. Economies of scale/ scope. Given the comparatively low cost of adding additional users 
and suppliers to a data-driven platform after the initial fixed costs (for example for server 
space), established online platforms strongly profit from economies of scale advantages. 
Platforms with an already extended customer base, comprehensive datasets on transac-
tions and user behaviour are also able to vertically integrate and enter new online markets 
with relative ease. Amazon and Apple are good examples28. That way, they achieve eco-
nomies of scope.
3. Data. Access to large quantities of highly detailed data can be a decisive competitive 
advantage and a source of market domination for online platforms. One aspect of the 
asymmetrical distribution of data is that it renders the emergence of competitors more 
difficult, as they cannot draw on the same deep and diverse data sets (e.g. on consumer 
preferences) in order to refine their services such as bespoke/individualised offers. The 
real value of data for online platforms is often derived by combining existing data-sets, 
for example the consumption pattern in an online shop on the one hand and geo-location 
data from a different service on the other. 
The combined impact of indirect network effects, economies of scale, data-driven vertical 
integration and economies of scope can and indeed has resulted in market concentration and 
domination in numerous online platform markets.29 Above all, the power concentrated in the 
hands of the largest platforms – Google, Amazon, Facebook and to a lesser extent Apple – 
has led to calls for higher scrutiny or even a break-up of these tech giants. The raw numbers 
confirm their dominance in many different markets: Facebook and Google are estimated to 
have captured an 84 percent share of the global online ad revenue market in 2017 (excluding 
China).30 Google dominates the global search market with a share of 91 percent and, together 
with Apple, the virtually entire mobile operation systems markets with 99 percent globally.31
Market domination is not a competition problem per se. Competition authorities only have to 
step in if such domination leads to market abuse. Market abuse can have negative outcomes 
(less choice, higher prices) for consumers, especially if they get locked-in on one platform with 
no multi-homing possibilities or if switching costs between platforms are high (owing to the 
absence of data portability and general interoperability between platforms). From a business 
perspective, it can lead to the suppression of newcomers. Most problematic and prone to 
abuse is where market concentration results from an asymmetric access to large amounts 
of personal and transaction data (possibly sourced from the platform’s services in other mar-
kets). Given such asymmetric data advantages, it can become nigh impossible for newcomers 
to seriously challenge a dominant market position, unless the challenger has sourced very 
large amounts of relevant data from other markets. 
Ensuring the smooth functioning of online markets should play an essential role in preserving 
the integrity of the Single Market and improving its potential to deliver a better overall outcome 
for European citizens. The European Commissioner for Competition, Margrethe Vestager, has 
stated on multiple occasions that the Commission will use all available tools to prevent the 
abuse of market power by large online platforms. DG COMP has opened three investigations 
28.  Amazon, via its AmazonPrime subscription model, offers services (directly and indirectly) spanning from online retail to video and 
music streaming to e-books, domestic services intermediation or meal delivery.
29.  Bertin Martens, An Economic Policy Perspective on Online Platforms, report prepared for the Commission by the Institute for 
Prospective Technological Studies, Digital Economy Working Paper, 05/2016.
30.  Matthew Garrahan, Google and Facebook dominance forecast to rise, Financial Times, 04.12.2017.
31.  Statista, Global mobile OS market share in sales to end users from 1st quarter 2009 to 2nd quarter 2017.
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into Google in recent years and fined the company €2.42 billion in 2017 for illegally giving an 
advantage to its own service, Google shopping, on the search engine, essentially violating 
platform neutrality.32 The most important question at this point is, however, whether the Com-
mission has the (right) tools to combat the abuse of market power at its disposal and which 
additional regulation could help to detect and counter the abuse of market-dominating posi-
tions in individual platform markets. 
What to do? Policy-makers should increasingly pay attention to the role of data for individual 
online platforms and platform markets. With regards to the central competition activities of 
the Commission (commercial competition, antitrust, state aid, and company mergers) the role 
of proprietary data as an economic resource is most relevant when assessing company mer-
gers and commercial competition. 
1. The role of data for mergers & acquisitions: After an acquisition, an online platform is 
often able to integrate various data-sets (for example transactional or customer data) 
into its existing business model and thus get an unfair advantage over potential rivals. 
The primary example here was the 2014 acquisition of WhatsApp for $19 billion by Face-
book, which at the time had neither substantial revenues nor many employees (around 
50), but already more than 1 billion active users on its messenger service. By merging 
contact details from WhatsApp with already existing Facebook profiles on a global scale, 
the social network was able to get a much more valuable (combined) data-set on its 
users, enabling better targeted advertising. The acquisition was subject to a competition 
policy investigation at the time, but the Commission did not object to the deal. In 2017, 
however, the Commission fined Facebook €110 million for providing misleading infor-
mation about the WhatsApp purchase (precisely regarding the integration of WhatsApp 
data into other services of Facebook) but did not rescind its waiver of the acquisition. 
The WhatsApp case highlights the significance of data for merger control. DG COMP 
should constantly update their guidelines with regards to market abuse via data domi-
nance. Access to third-party data and the combination of data sets from various sources 
should come under particular scrutiny. One recent national example for this is the new 
guidelines for the Federal German competition authority. These have led already to an in-
vestigation into Facebook’s possible abuse of market power by collecting third-party data 
on users without their knowledge or consent.33  
2. GDPR: The “data portability” right to take user data from one platform to another (for exa-
mple on social networks), enshrined in the GDPR, which took effect on 26 May 2018, is ex-
pected to increase the multi-homing options for users and hence competition. The GDPR 
and the accompanying e-privacy regulation also make it illegal in many cases to combine 
consumer data from various platforms without an individual’s consent. Policy-makers 
should give their full backing to the new European data protection regime especially given 
the legal uncertainty over GDPR’s concrete applicability.
3. Open Data: Another idea to counter the power of platforms is to force them to share parts 
of their collected data with the public, for example in developing non-profit local services. 
There are already numerous examples where Open Data approaches have helped local 
municipalities improve their services. If online platforms were forced to share relevant 
data (especially non-personal data, for example on road conditions or popular cycling 
paths inside cities) with the public, developers could make use of the vast troves of data 
collected by dominating platforms to create specialized services. That way, the data mo-
nopolies of large platforms could be weakened. 
32.  European Commission, Timeline of Google Search (Shopping) Investigation,  30.05.2018.
33.  Bundeskartellamt, “Gegen Facebook können wir vorgehen“, Transcript of an interview with Andreas Mundt, head of the German 
Bundeskartellamt, 01.01.2018.
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4. Interoperability: Lastly, forcing platforms towards more interoperability could be another 
way to counter the dominant positions of platforms. Interoperability, e.g. the possibility for 
users to communicate from Facebook to Telegram directly, would certainly reduce lock-in 
effects and allow competitors to integrate their services more swiftly with other platform 
services.
2.4 Algorithmic decision-making and discrimination 
A more recent debate among European policy-makers revolves around the social and econo-
mic challenges of algorithmic decision-making. While not exclusively platform-related, algo-
rithmic decision-making is crucial for the functioning of the platform economy and directly 
affects tens of millions of Europeans daily in the Single Market. The different statistical and 
pattern recognition models (often subsumed under the label “machine learning”) put to use by 
online platforms power important core functions such as rankings, match-making or fraud de-
tection. Facebook uses self-learning models that constantly and dynamically adapt the news-
feed of the users to their predicted information preferences. 
In many cases, automated decision-making is harmless and algorithms (essentially pro-
blem-solving paths turned into software) in general should not be mythologised as dark and 
inscrutable forces steering human behaviour.34 However, there are cases where a wrong algo-
rithm-based decision can cause real-world damage to a user, for example if a loan or job appli-
cation is turned down based on an algorithmic assessment. Many scholars have shown how 
automatic decision-making systems inadvertently but systematically discriminate against mi-
norities.35 One of the more infamous cases involved the Google image recognition systems, 
which upon release repeatedly mis-identified black people as gorillas.36 Such errors can occur 
through wrong training data selection, wrong choice of models, societal biases built into mo-
dels or self-reinforcing feedback loops. Whatever the nature of the specific problem, it is often 
complicated to determine from the outside whether an automated decision-making system has 
an inbuilt bias or not. A good part of the algorithms used by larger platforms are not open source, 
but proprietary and, as trade secrets are often the most relevant part of the intellectual property 
of online platforms, their source code is not open to public scrutiny. Online platforms further 
argue that, if they had to disclose relevant details of their decision-making systems, it would be 
very easy for scammers and fraudsters to game for example a platform’s reputation system. The 
results are substantial information asymmetries between online platforms on the one hand and 
citizens and regulators on the other. In light of these developments, how can European citizens 
retain their trust in an innovative European platform economy and digital future in general? How 
can regulators close the information gap between platforms and the rest? 
1. GDPR: One step in this direction from a consumer perspective is again the General Data 
Protection Regulation (GDPR). It includes a right to explanation of automated decisions 
based on machine learning (although its exact meaning is being debated)37 and it also 
gives consumers and citizens the right to a final human intervention (over a loan, job ap-
plication etc.) to avoid algorithm-only decision-making. 
2. A European Watchdog agency: However, the question remains whether these individual 
rights will be enough to establish trust in automatic decision-making and machine lear-
ning within the platform economy. Since the importance of these systems is only going to 
grow, new ways have to be found to establish trust and hold platforms accountable for the 
results of their actions. One solution would be a European watchdog agency that helps to 
34.  Kathrin Passig, The Black Box is a State of Mind, Eurozine, 02.12.2018 (in the future?).
35.  Claire Cain Miller, When Algorithms Discriminate, New York Times, 09.07.2015.
36.  James Vincent, Google ‘fixed’ its racist algorithm by removing gorillas from its image-labeling tech, The Verge, 12.02.2018.
37.  Andrew Burt, Is there a ‘right to explanation’ for machine learning in the GDPR?, International Association of Privacy Professionals, 
IAPP. Date?
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ensure that the specific algorithms used in the EU that bear the danger of discrimination 
or misuse are constantly vetted and evaluated. Among others, the French CNNum has re-
cently specified such ideas with its proposal for a European Agency for Trust in the Digital 
Platform Economy.38 This body would closely collaborate with the platforms themselves 
and have both the technical capabilities to examine algorithms and the political mandate 
to test automated decision-making systems (for example using reverse engineering tech-
niques such as black box testing) to prevent discrimination.
3. Involvement of civil society actors: Future policy work on algorithms and automated de-
cision-making has to become more inclusive. The Commission should step up its efforts 
as a public mediator fostering dialogues between consumers, civil society actors and plat-
forms. Current efforts to develop a European code of ethiucs for the application of algo-
rithms should indeed be stepped up.
CONCLUSION
Online platforms are among the most important drivers of the digital transformation in the 
Single Market. However, their innovative potential creates new challenges for regulators and 
society at large. The aim of this paper was to give an overview on some of the most relevant 
policy areas where online platforms clash with traditional regulation and where new rules mi-
ght be needed. When it comes to new regulation, two overarching guidelines should be ap-
plied: new rules can be justified in order to ensure the integrity and functioning of the Single 
market and to increase its potential. They should also be aimed at increasing trust of European 
citizens in a European platform economy. 
Concretely, new or updated rules should be created for platform to business relations, compe-
tition policy and for the use of algorithmic decision-making. The detailed policy recommenda-
tions are outlined in the table below.
38.  Luca Belli and Nicolo Zingales (eds.), Platform regulations. How platforms are regulated and how they regulate us. Official Out-
come of the UN IGF Dynamic Coalition on Platform Responsibility.2017.
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